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ABSTRACT. All estimates of party system change rely on coding decisions regarding the 
categorization of parties as old or new. However, such dichotomous coding is insensitive 
to links between new parties and previously existing ones or extensive internal change 
in old parties. This paper looks at an important but so far understudied indicator of 
internal party change – the turnover of electoral candidates. Turnover is analysed in 55 
elections in Central and Eastern Europe – a region with high levels of internal change in 
established parties and frequent new parties with links to established ones. We contrast 
the findings on electoral candidate turnover to volatility scores reported in previous 
studies. We also identify important cases of: (a) new parties that are only moderately 
novel, (b) old parties that underwent a significant internal change and (c) parties that 
were neither old nor new. The last category of partially novel parties pose most acute 
problems for the indices of party system change. 
 
How unstable are party systems and individual parties? The most widely used indicator of party system change 
is the Pedersen’s electoral volatility index, as it is intuitive and easy to calculate.1 However, it was much easier 
to apply in Pedersen’s early work on West European party systems characterized by high levels of 
organizational continuity among parties than it has been in the last couple of decades – particularly in new 
democracies that have seen very high degrees of organizational innovation among political parties. Perhaps 
the most important problem facing investigators when calculating volatility in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE, the region that we focus on in this paper) is that calculation of volatility has nearly always been based 
on dichotomously distinguishing between new and old parties and, in case of splits and mergers, identifying a 
singular successor or predecessor. This paper is primarily motivated by our desire to explore levels of novelty 
within parties using an interval scale – that would allow for a more nuanced and adequate approach to the 
calculation of volatility that takes into account patterns of novelty and continuation among parties (outlined 
in Sikk and Köker 2015). Party novelty has several dimensions but in this paper we focus on perhaps the most 
understudied aspect of candidate change.2 
The paper is based on a dataset of electoral candidates in 55 elections CEE elections between 1993 and 2014. 
Most of the data has been collected from public sources, primarily those available online. The dataset includes 
                                                          
* The research for this paper has been partly been funded by the EU’s FP7 ANTICORRP project. 
1 Pedersen 1979, for applications see Drummond 2006; Lane and Ersson 2007; S. Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Scott Mainwaring, España, 
and Gervasoni 2009; Powell and Tucker 2014; Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Sikk 2005; Tavits 2005, 2008. Still, it does suffer from 
problems – particularly as it does not necessarily reflect individual level changes, even if it seems to aggregate them (see Dejaeghere 
and Dassonneville n.d.).  
2 Recent studies that problematize the dichotomous notion of party novelty either do not look at candidates (Litton 2013) or do so 
only in the passing (Barnea and Rahat 2011). 
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all current EU member states from the region, excluding Croatia and Romania, for which data has been more 
difficult to analyse or obtain, respectively.3 Table 1 shows an overview of data used in this paper. 
Table 1 Elections included in the study 
Election 
number 
BG CZ EE HU LT LV PL SI SK 
1   1992 1990   1991*   
2   1995 1994 1996 1995 1993*   
3 1994* 1996 1999 1998 2000 1998 1997  1994 
4 1997* 1998 2003 2002 2004 2002 2001  1998 
5 2001 2002 2007 2006 2008 2006 2005 2004 2002 
6 2005 2006 2011 2010 2012 2010 2007 2008 2006 
7 2009 2010 - 2014 - 2011 2011 2011 2010 
8 2013 2013 - - - 2014 - 2014 2012 
9 2014 - - - - - - - - 
* Only data for parties which entered parliament. 
We start with the analysis of overall trends over time in candidate novelty (and the related phenomenon of 
candidate dropout) in individual countries. We find that the trends vary in individual countries and looking at 
the region as a whole there is at best only a mild overall trend of diminishing candidate turnover. The second 
section of this paper explores the relationship between levels of candidate novelty/dropout and volatility – 
specifically comparing our indices to the volatility scores calculated by Powell and Tucker (2014). We discover 
that there is a clear relationship between the two and also find that novelty (particularly among established 
parties) is more strongly linked to economic growth than the volatility measures proposed in their article. We 
also find excessive discrepancy between the measures for some elections that, we believe, is related to 
debatable coding decisions regarding individual parties and, more broadly, impossibility of “correct” coding 
using a dichotomous approach to party novelty. The final section looks in more detail into candidate novelty 
among individual parties. We discover that two groups of larger parties – genuinely new parties and existing 
parties – can be distinguished relatively easily based on candidate novelty. However, problems are posed by 
electoral coalitions and partially novel parties. First, electoral coalitions – that are very common and often 
highly successful in CEE – often have low levels of candidate novelty, yet in most volatility calculations have 
been linked to one and only one predecessor. Partially novel parties are potentially even more complex cases. 
On the one hand, they are genuinely novel (e.g. in terms of leadership and name) yet, on the other hand, 
include many candidates in their lists who had previously run on other parties’ tickets. Once again, 
dichotomously coding such electons – to use a joint name for party lists and electoral coalitions (proposed in 
Sikk and Köker 2015) – “correctly” is impossible. However, given their often high levels of success, individual 
coding decisions can have very strong impact on the aggregate volatility scores. 
Candidate turnover in CEE 
Figure 1 shows the mean share of new candidates and the overall trends by countries – simply defined as 
those who did not contest the preceding election. The average figures are fairly high at around 75% with 
surprisingly little reduction over time.   
                                                          
3 We plan to include these as well as some of the missing earlier elections in future. 
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Figure 1 Overall share of new candidates 
 
Figure 2 Candidate novelty by countries (top 25% of candidates, parties with at least 5% of votes) 
 
Note: The fine black line show loess trend. 
However, most of the new candidates in almost all elections represent small (and insignificant) parties. Figure 
2 shows the trends in the share of new candidates among the top candidates of successful parties – using the 
threshold of five percent of votes – by individual countries. It is based on the comparison of top 25% of party’s 
candidates in constituencies (national lists in Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary 2014) with full candidate lists (for 
all parties) in the previous election. 4  We only look at the top quartile of candidates as they are arguably the 
most important; changes at the bottom of the list matter less for the overall level of candidate novelty. 
Generally speaking, candidate novelty has not decreased across the region. Only Estonia and Bulgaria have 
maintained a solid decreasing trend with respectively 23% and 33% of new candidates in 2011. The other Baltic 
states have seen a milder decrease. On the other hand, some countries have seen marked increases in novelty 
– particularly the Czech Republic – or retain high levels of candidate novelty (Slovenia, for which our data does 
not go back before the 2000/2004 pair of elections). The trend across the region is only mildly decreasing at 
best. However, the most notable feature of Figure 2 are the enormous fluctuations in candidate novelty – 
particularly in Hungary and Poland. This is caused by the breakthroughs of genuinely new parties that have 
                                                          
4 In some elections (particularly in Estonia 1995), some parties have run extremely oversized lists, with the number of candidates more 
than twice the number of seats in the parliament. To correct for such situations, top 25% and “full lists” are defined by district 
magnitude (i.e. 0.25M and M, respectively), or total number of seats where national lists have been used for analysis. 
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markedly more novel candidate lists than established parties (see below). The other reason for downward 
spikes is clearly that of pre-term elections – such as Poland 2007, Latvia 2011, Slovakia 2012 and Bulgaria 2014.  
Figure 3 shows the extent of candidate novelty among established parties – defined here as those who did not 
run in the preceding election according to the Manifesto Project.5  There is a slight negative overall trend, with 
average candidate novelty among established parties decreasing from around 50% in early 1990s to around 
30% in the most recent elections. Established party candidate novelty has generally decreased in some 
countries – particularly in Hungary where only about one in four among top candidates did not run in previous 
election for the last three elections. However, the trend is far from uniform and some countries have 
experienced consistently increasing candidate novelty even amongst established parties (particularly the 
Czech Republic). 
Figure 3 Candidate novelty among established parties, by countries (top 25% of candidates) 
 
Note: only parties that were not coded as new in Volkens et al. 2014 that received at least 5% of votes. The fine black line show loess 
trend. 
Figure 4 Candidate dropout by countries (top 25% of candidates, parties with at least 5% of votes in t-1) 
 
Finally, candidate dropout levels – i.e. the share of top 25% candidates that did not contest the following 
election – follow a broadly similar trend to that of novelty. There are, however, interesting individual parties 
                                                          
5 Volkens et al. 2014. As discussed below, some of the established parties – particularly electoral alliances with sometimes limited 
degree of novelty – are excluded from this set of parties as they are assigned a different party code in the dataset. 
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which have shown remarkable degrees of candidate dropouts that has not always been matched by candidate 
novelty (see Appendix 2). The reason why the two can diverge is that we are comparing the top 25% of 
candidates in one election to full lists in another. Hypothetically, it is possible that while all top candidates 
dropped out in the next election (e.g. because of scandals), all of the top 25% in the second election had 
already run in the previous one.6  
Candidate turnover and volatility 
As one could expect, the overall candidate novelty is positively correlated to volatility (see Figure 5). However, 
the relationship is far from perfect. Notably, some countries seem to have consistently higher than expected 
levels of volatility (Lithuania) while others have consistently lower levels of volatility (Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary). We contend that this might be related to different levels of typical candidate novelty, but 
it is more likely to be the result of coding decisions regarding new parties, coalitions and mergers – i.e. electon 
continuity is better or even excessively taken into account in the latter while major coalitions or partly novel 
electons (see below) might have been coded as new in Lithuania. 
Figure 5 Total volatility and candidate novelty (parties with more than 5% of votes) 
 
Source: total volatility from Powell & Tucker (2013) 
To what extent is candidate replacement a consequence of new party entry and old party exit? Figure 6 shows 
the relationship between the average of candidate novelty and dropout, and Type A volatility – i.e. volatility 
caused by the entry and exit of parties form the political system (Powell and Tucker 2014, 124). The 
relationship is surprisingly weak. Some of the cases in Figure 6 emphasize the extent of political elite turnover 
not fully reflected in Type A volatility index. For example, the  2001 elections in Bulgaria and Poland saw many 
new candidates join and many old candidates leave tops of party lists, yet this is not fully reflected in the Type 
A volatility scores. The Polish election was a true earthquake as four parties that can be considered fully or 
partially new entered parliament with a combined vote share of 40.3%. The Bulgarian election saw a 
breakthrough of National Movement – Simeon II, one of the most successful genuine new parties in the region 
ever (won half of the seats). However, the Type A volatility score is only around the average for the elections 
included in the joint dataset.  
On the other hand, the type A volatility score for Lithuania 2004 is strikingly high given the medium candidate 
turnover (see 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 for details on individual parties). The election did see a breakthroughs of an important 
new electons: (a) the genuinely novel Labour Party (DP), the newness of which is corroborated by candidate 
                                                          
6 It is obviously much more less likely that all top candidates ran again, but all of top 25% were new candidates. 
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novelty data, (b) the partially novel “For Order & Justice” (UTT) of the impeached president Rolandas Paksas, 
with almost 50% of its candidates having run in the previous election and (c) Liberal & Centre Union (LICS) that 
had a moderate level of candidate novelty (33%) generally typical of well-established parties. Two major 
parties also disappeared: the Liberal Union (LLS) and the New Union (NS). However, as the analysis of 
candidate drop-out data reveals, their candidate drop-out rates were rather low – particularly for LLS. Most 
of their candidates found a place on the lists of one of the new parties or the Working for Lithuania (UdL) 
coalition of Social Democratic Party and New Union. It had the lowest level of candidate novelty among main 
parties in the election, but has been coded as a new electon by Powell & Tucker. We do not wish to criticise 
the authors – who we believe have added a landmark contribution to the literature on party system change –
as coding of elections with high degrees of complex electon innovation is extremely challenging and actually 
impossible to do “correctly” using a dichotomous scheme. 
Figure 6 Type A (exit/entry) volatility, and mean of candidate novelty & dropout 
 
Source: total volatility from Powell & Tucker (2013) 
Figure 7 Candidate novelty in Lithuania (V%>5%) 
 
Figure 8 Candidate drop-out in Lithuania (V%>10%) 
 
Type B volatility and candidate novelty among established parties (Figure 9) are correlated mildly but more 
strongly than Type A volatility to candidate turnover. There seems to be a general trend that increased 
candidate novelty leads to increased volatility or, alternatively, existing parties rejuvenate their candidate lists 
if they anticipate changes in electoral support. In particular, parties that are expected to do poorly may recruit 
new top candidate, possibly to replace former dignitaries that have left party politics anticipating downfall. 
However, volatility can obviously come about for different reasons than internal candidate change and 
rejuvenation of electoral lists can turn the waning tide for parties in decline.  
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Figure 9 Type B volatility and candidate novelty among established parties 
 
Source: total volatility from Powell & Tucker (2013) 
Powell & Tucker (2014) argued that we know little about the determinants of volatility in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Replication of the fully specified regression models (using elections included in Powell & Tucker and 
our datasets) returns no significant coefficients and neither do similarly specified models explain levels of 
candidate novelty. However, it is notable that a much simpler model that includes GDP change from previous 
election alongside country fixed effects (see Table 2) shows that improvement in economic conditions does 
lead to increased total volatility and lower candidate turnover. The effect on novelty is particularly robust 
among established parties with 10% growth over the previous electoral period leading to 3% fewer new 
candidates among established parties or 25% growth (the median in the joint dataset) to almost 8% fewer 
new candidates. Hungary and the Czech Republic tend to have lower than average levels of candidate novelty 
that is in line with literature arguing early consolidation of these two party systems, but has been challenged 
by recent high levels of candidate novelty. (Powell & Tucker data finishes with 2009). 
Table 2 Effect of GDP change on volatility, candidate novelty and dropout 
Dependent 
variable: 
Total volatility TypeA volatility TypeB volatility 
Candidate novelty Candidate 
dropout All parties Established parties 
(Intercept) 79.81 (18.51)
***
 50.12 (24.36)
*
 29.69 (11.66)
**
 88.80 (13.20)
***
 90.31 (12.54)
***
 
72.06 
(9.88)
***
 
GDPt/GDPt-1 -27.53 (15.07)
*
 -18.85 (19.82) -8.68 (9.49) -25.16 (10.74)
**
 -31.32 (10.21)
***
 -14.34 (8.04)
*
 
CZ -31.13 (9.69)
***
 -21.41 (12.75) -9.73 (6.10) -27.85 (6.91)
***
 -29.67 (6.56)
***
 
-21.11 
(5.17)
***
 
EE 1.11 (9.04) 3.06 (11.90) -1.95 (5.69) -14.29 (6.44)
**
 -16.79 (6.12)
**
 
-13.94 
(4.82)
***
 
HU -22.43 (8.97)
**
 -16.07 (11.80) -6.36 (5.65) -25.41 (6.39)
***
 -21.67 (6.08)
***
 
-10.24 
(4.79)
**
 
LT 25.29 (10.11)
**
 31.03 (13.30)
**
 -5.74 (6.37) -14.11 (7.21)
*
 -16.61 (6.85)
**
 
-17.97 
(5.39)
***
 
LV 6.42 (10.12) 9.58 (13.32) -3.17 (6.37) -5.24 (7.21) -8.28 (6.86) -6.29 (5.40) 
PL -1.29 (8.51) -0.25 (11.19) -1.05 (5.36) -10.97 (6.06)
*
 -11.12 (5.76)
*
 0.29 (4.54) 
SI 0.17 (14.66) -4.38 (19.29) 4.55 (9.23) -2.94 (10.45) 1.30 (9.93) -7.87 (7.82) 
SK 11.72 (9.84) 18.78 (12.95) -7.08 (6.20) -11.77 (7.01) -14.38 (6.67)
**
 -4.95 (5.25) 
R
2
 0.66 0.51 0.24 0.59 0.64 0.67 
Adj. R
2
 0.51 0.29 -0.11 0.41 0.48 0.52 
Num. obs. 30 30 30 30 30 30 
***
p < 0.01, 
**
p < 0.05, 
*
p < 0.1 
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Party novelty and partial novelty 
We now turn to candidate novelty in individual parties. How many of the parties are genuinely new and how 
many qualify as old in terms of their candidate lists? Looking at all parties, regardless of their levels of support, 
highly new parties dominate – new candidates form the majority among top 25% candidates in most of them 
(see the black area defined by a kernel density curve on Figure 10). Levels of novelty decrease fast when we 
look at progressively more popular parties. Among parties that entered the parliament (roughly those with 
more than 5% of votes – lighter than dark red on Figure 10) we see increasing dominance of parties in which 
less than 50% of top candidates were new. Among the bulk of major parties (more than 10% of votes), those 
with between 10% and 40% of new candidates dominate (the peak of the yellow density curve on Figure 10). 
The novelty does not completely tail off at high levels. A considerable portion of major and parliamentary 
parties had more than 50% of new top candidates. Most intriguingly, there is another peak in the distribution 
at close to perfect novelty – that stands for genuinely new parties (Sikk and Köker 2015; Sikk 2005). Also 
notably, a (slightly smaller) number of parties still falls between the two peaks. The parties with 50-80% of 
new top candidates are partially novel parties that are particularly problematic for the purposes of volatility 
calculation (see Sikk and Köker 2015). 
Figure 10 Candidate novelty by vote% 
 
Note: Kernel density curves: black (all parties), dark red (V>1%), red (V>2.5%), orange (V>5%), yellow (V>10%). 
What are these highly successful parties with high levels of candidate novelty? Table 3 (the rows in bold) shows 
that all countries except for Hungary have seen breakthroughs of such genuinely new parties with more than 
10% of votes and more than 80% of new top candidates – most of them twice. At the bottom of the table we 
find mostly electoral coalitions (or mergers, in italics) that are somewhat novel by the virtue of new 
organization or at least electoral strategy, but are often below the mean level of candidate novelty in our 
dataset (45.2 percent; indicated by the dashed line). Some of the others are post-electoral coalition electons; 
few of them can, notably, be seen as splinters from a previously existing proper party. Finally, a number of 
parties with candidate novelty scores between 40 and 80 percent are not straightforward cases off coalitions, 
splinters or mergers. These are generally formations with novel names and organizational structures, yet 
include a significant number of candidate at the top of their lists who had been running for other parties 
previously. In many cases, they have a complex organizational history and can only meaningfully classified as 
partially novel parties. In such cases, the line between continuations and new parties is very blurred. However, 
as some of the parties won the elections in these years, assigning them into categories of new or old parties 
can make a decisive difference to volatility score calculations. Indeed, we advocate elsewhere a more nuanced 
approach in such cases, that incorporates candidate novelty measured on an interval scale (Sikk and Köker 
2015). 
Interestingly, sometimes parties which do not undergo any significant organizational (or name) changes, see 
high levels of candidate turnover (see Table 4). Whether such parties should be seen as continuations is 
debatable. 
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Table 3 Candidate novelty in new parties (following party codes in Manifesto Data Collection) 
   New candidate % Vote % 
NDSV National Movement Simeon the Second BG 2001 98.6 42.7 
Smer Direction-Social Democracy SK 2002 97.4 13.5 
JL New Era LV 2002 96.3 24.0 
RP Palikot's Movement PL 2011 95.3 10.0 
SaS Freedom and Solidarity SK 2010 94.7 12.1 
DP Labour Party LT 2004 94.4 28.4 
VV Public Affairs CZ 2010 94.3 10.9 
TPP National Resurrection Party LT 2008 94.1 15.1 
SMC Party of Miro Cerar SI 2014 92.0 34.5 
RP Union for the Republic EE 2003 88.5 24.6 
GERB Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria BG 2009 87.8 39.7 
SRP Self-Defence of the Polish Republic PL 2001 86.9 10.2 
NS New Union (Social Liberals) LT 2000 77.8 19.6 
PO Civic Platform PL 2001 76.9 12.7 
Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary HU 2010 75.6 16.7 
TP People’s Party LV 1998 74.1 21.3 
TOP09 Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09 CZ 2010 72.7 16.7 
LLS Lithuanian Liberal Union LT 2000 66.7 17.3 
PS Zoran Jankovic's List - Positive Slovenia SI 2011 62.5 28.5 
LSDA Latvian Social Democratic Alliance LV 1998 59.3 12.9 
KMÜ Coalition Party and Rural Union EE 1995 57.7 32.2 
UTT Coalition of Rolandas Paksas ‘For Order and Justice' LT 2004 55.6 11.4 
PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia LV 2002 55.6 19.1 
ERL Estonian People’s Union EE 2003 53.8 13.0 
KzB Coalition for Bulgaria BG 2001 53.5 17.1 
SNS Slovak National Party SK 2006 47.4 11.7 
SDL' Party of the Democratic Left SK 1998 47.4 14.7 
AWS Electoral Action ‘Solidarity' PL 1997 47.0 33.8 
DL Democratic Left BG 1997 46.5 22.1 
ER Estonian Reform Party EE 1995 46.2 16.2 
SDKÚ Slovak Democratic and Christian Union SK 2002 44.7 15.1 
UW Freedom Union PL 1997 41.7 13.4 
BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party BG 2013 41.2 26.6 
IL Pro Patria Union EE 1999 40.0 16.1 
FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP Alliance HU 2006 39.1 42.5 
SLD Democratic Left Alliance PL 2005 36.4 11.3 
ODS United Democratic Forces BG 1997 36.2 52.2 
K Estonian Center Party EE 1995 34.6 14.2 
LiD Left and Democrats PL 2007 33.1 13.2 
DP Labour Party LT 2012 27.8 20.7 
SLD-UP Coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Union of Labour PL 2001 25.4 41.0 
LSDP Lithuanian Social Democratic Party LT 2008 22.2 11.7 
TB-LNNK For Fatherland and Freedom National Independence Movement LV 1998 22.2 14.7 
UdL Working for Lithuania LT 2004 22.2 20.6 
PTT Order and Justice LT 2008 16.7 12.7 
SDK Slovak Democratic Coalition SK 1998 13.2 26.3 
TS-LKD Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats LT 2008 11.1 19.7 
BSDK A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition LT 2000 11.1 31.1 
FiDeSz-MPP-MDF FiDeSz-MPP-MDF-Alliance HU 2002 6.5 41.1 
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Table 4 Old parties with candidate novelty > 60% 
   % new candidates % votes 
FKgP Independent Smallholders’ Party HU 1994 80.4 8.8 
DPS Movement for Rights and Freedom BG 2001 78.9 7.5 
Desus Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia SI 2011 75.0 7.0 
PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia LV 2006 74.1 6.0 
ATAKA National Union Attack BG 2009 71.6 9.4 
LPR League of Polish Families PL 2005 67.7 8.0 
SLS Slovenian People's Party SI 2011 66.7 6.8 
ODS Civic Democratic Party CZ 2013 66.7 7.7 
SRP Self-Defence of the Polish Republic PL 2005 65.1 11.4 
KDNP Christian Democratic People’s Party HU 1994 60.9 7.0 
Note: as defined in Manifesto Research Group dataset 
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper has looked at levels of candidate novelty in Central and Eastern Europe. We saw a limited overall 
trend towards stabilization of candidate lists with some countries stabilizing more consistently than others. 
Most importantly, the trends in candidate novelty echo arguments in other literature about dynamics of 
individual party systems. In particular, we see a very clear pattern of suddenly disrupted consolidation in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary and steady consolidation in Estonia. The index of candidate novelty is correlated 
to volatility scores recently proposed by Powell & Tucker (2014), but the relationship is less than perfect. 
Indeed, looking at candidate novelty scores can indicate issues with the coding of party entry and exit. 
However, we argue that – more fundamentally – all electoral volatility scores that rely on dichotomous coding 
of new and old parties as well as splits, mergers and electoral coalitions are bound to be misleading due to 
prominent partially novel parties with intermediate levels of novelty. Such electons (to use a joint term for 
parties and coalitions) are pervasive in CEE, but they are certainly also present elsewhere – e.g. Israel (Barnea 
and Rahat 2011) and Denmark (Sikk and Köker 2015). 
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APPENDIX 1: Candidate novelty (large parties by countries) 
Notes: Parties with more than 10 percent of votes shown. The size of markers is proportional to a party’s vote share in t. 
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APPENDIX 2: Candidate dropout (large parties by countries) 
Notes: Parties with more than 10 percent of votes in election t shown; the year corresponds to election t+1 – i.e. the year when the dropouts happened. The size of markers 
is proportional to a party’s vote share in t. 
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